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DOES STATE OWNERSHIP HURT OR HELP MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS? 
INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE FROM CONTROL BLOCK ACQUISITIONS 
RESEARCH SUMMARY 
We argue that state ownership is a crucial policy instrument for alleviating what is perhaps the 
most important principal-principal (PP) agency problem around the globe: private benefits of 
control (PBC). Our results illustrate that states reduce PBC in the companies in which they 
acquire controlling ownership positions. We also examine how legal and political institutions 
influence the extent to which states accomplish this goal. Anti-self-dealing legal regulations 
make states more effective in their efforts to constrain PBC, while political constraints make 
them less effective. Regimes with high state capacity appear not to prioritize PBC reduction. We 
test and corroborate these ideas in a sample of 1,354 control transactions across 54 countries. 
MANAGERIAL SUMMARY 
The one-sided appropriation of wealth by dominant owners is arguably the biggest threat to 
minority shareholders around the globe. An important question that has thus far remained 
unaddressed is whether state ownership of firms increases or decreases the extraction of these so-
called private benefits of control. By investigating a large number of transactions involving the 
transfer of corporate control in 54 countries, we find that state acquirers of controlling ownership 
positions generally respect minority shareholder rights more than other types of new controlling 
shareholders. This effect is stronger in countries with strong legal protection of minority 
shareholders. However, political constraints make it more challenging for state acquirers to keep 
PBC in check while “strong” states may (mis)use the firms they invest in as policy vehicles.  
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INTRODUCTION 
State capitalism is on the rise across the globe (Bruton et al., 2015; Guillén & Capron, 2016; 
Inoue, Lazzarini, & Musacchio, 2013; Wood & Wright, 2015). After decades of privatization, in 
which states reduced their involvement in the corporate sector (Filatotchev, Buck, & Zhukov, 
2000; Vaaler & Schrage, 2009), governments are now again becoming more actively involved in 
corporations (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). For instance, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were 
involved in 9 of the 15 largest IPOs between 2005 and 2012, represented 10% of global GDP in 
2010, and grossed $3.6 trillion in sales in 2011 (The Economist, 2012a). 
These developments entail more than a pendulum swing, as state ownership itself has 
changed dramatically over the years (Grosman, Okhmatovskiy, & Wright, 2016). SOEs used to 
be owned by the state in their entirety (Megginson & Netter, 2001), but recently states have 
begun to work side-by-side with private investors in mixed enterprises not previously 
government-linked (Bruton et al., 2015; Liu, Beirne, & Sun, 2015; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
2014; Shi, Hoskisson, & Zhang, 2016). Overall, it seems that states increasingly engage with 
private corporations for strategic reasons, rather than for bailing out corporations in financial 
distress (Musacchio, Lazzarini, & Aguilera, 2015; Rudy, Miller, & Wang, 2016; Stephan, 
Uhlaner, & Stride, 2015). 
What these accounts of state involvement fail to explain, however, is what role states play 
in corporate governance in general and what it entails for the position of minority shareholders in 
particular (van Essen, van Oosterhout, & Heugens, 2013; Young et al., 2008). Corporate 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
governance theory is focused on securing the interests of minority shareholders by reducing 
agency conflicts (Guillén & Capron, 2016; La Porta et al., 1998). Agency problems may derive 
from principal-agent (PA) agency conflicts when managers prioritize their self-interest over 
shareholder objectives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). State ownership is rarely effective at 
constraining these PA agency problems due to the low monitoring incentives of state 
shareholders compared to those of private shareholders (Peng et al., 2016). Another type of 
agency problem derives from principal-principal (PP) agency conflicts, involving situations in 
which controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders (Young et al., 2008). While 
this problem likely outweighs PA problems in terms of material consequences for minority 
shareholders (Young et al., 2008), we currently have an insufficient understanding of how state 
acquisitions of controlling ownership positions affect PP agency conflicts. 
PP conflicts often materialize in the form of private benefits of control (PBC). PBC are 
private returns that controlling shareholders appropriate in excess of their ownership rights. PBC 
do not only affect minority shareholders, but also firm performance by increasing borrowing 
costs (Lin et al., 2018). We theorize that when states become controlling shareholders, they have 
comparatively stronger incentives to refrain from extracting PBC than when private parties 
become controlling shareholders. The reason for this is that states feel the long-term 
consequences of PBC extraction more severely whereas the “expropriation of minority 
shareholders does not imply any costs for [private] controlling shareholders” (Filatotchev et al., 
2001, p. 303). Specifically, PBC extraction negatively impacts the long-term functioning and 
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performance of the nation state. For instance, PBC may hamper the development of financial 
markets and complicate the political process by shifting control over the economy to oligarchs 
and business elites (Morck, Wolfenzon, & Yeung, 2005). 
We furthermore consider three institutional contingencies to understand the mechanisms 
through which state ownership affects PBC extraction. First, we investigate the moderating role 
of legal institutions designed to protect minority shareholders against self-dealing transactions. 
State ownership traditionally is considered a strategic liability (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), 
causing agency problems (Peng et al., 2016) and the pursuit of political (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1998) or social objectives over economic goals (Bai & Xu, 2005). We predict that when state 
acquirers use both ownership and regulation against self-dealing, they exhibit an even stronger 
commitment to the goal of reducing PBC and will create an environment where state owners are 
less tempted to extract PBC themselves. Second, we scrutinize political institutions that constrain 
government discretion (Bortolotti, Cambini, & Rondi, 2013; Henisz, 2000). While political 
constraints are often considered favorable in terms of creating stable political environments, we 
predict that political constraints increase PBC consumption by state acquirers because it lowers 
the ability of governments to engage swiftly and unanimously in the governance of mixed 
ownership firms. Third, we theorize the effects of state capacity as another important political 
institution on the tendency of state acquirers to extract PBC (Guillén & Capron, 2016; Hanson, 
2014). State capacity captures a state’s ability to realize its political ambitions and enforce its 
policy objectives efficiently. While a basic level of state capacity is necessary for addressing 
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PBC, we argue that high-capacity states are powerful enough to pursue policy objectives 
important to the state and its many stakeholders instead of the goals and objectives of for-profit 
firms and its minority shareholders. 
We test our ideas in a sample of 54 countries to address the lack of international state 
capitalism research (Bruton et al., 2015) and to highlight the role of the state as an important yet 
understudied actor in corporate governance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003). We use control 
transaction premiums to estimate the level of PBC captured by controlling owners (Albuquerque 
& Schroth, 2010, 2015; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). These premiums measure the amount of private 
benefits expected after the private acquisition of a controlling block of shares is completed 
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). While control transaction premiums are 
the conventional way to assess PBC, some studies have gauged PBC by computing dual-class 
voting premiums (Nenova, 2003; Zingales, 1994). The benefit of using control transaction 
premiums is that it allows us to cover a larger and more representative international sample, as 
dual-class shares are illegal in many countries. New controlling owners can be either the state 
(i.e., state acquirer) or a private party (i.e., private acquirer). Our sample consists of 1,354 
control transactions, making it about three times larger than the landmark study by Dyck and 
Zingales (2004), which involved 393 transactions.  
We make two contributions with our work. First, we contribute to the corporate 
governance literature by shedding new light on the strategic role of the state in corporate 
governance (Bruton et al., 2015). Specifically, we show that states actively intervene in the 
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governance of firms to minimize PBC when they acquire a controlling stake in firms not 
previously government-linked. Whereas state ownership is frequently seen as a source of agency 
problems in its own right, we argue that a complementary stewardship perspective is necessary 
to fully understand the reasons for state involvement in corporate governance. 
Second, we contribute to international business research by exploring the institutional 
contingencies that affect state acquirers’ ability to curtail PBC from an international comparative 
perspective. Whereas prior studies have stressed the direct effects of macro-level institutions on 
corporate outcomes, we show that institutional effects frequently operate by either supporting or 
inhibiting the ability of the state to intervene at the micro-level (Jackson, 2010; van Essen et al., 
2012). Our findings show that country-level institutions have a powerful influence on the 
motivation and ability of state acquirers to curb PBC. Specifically, we show that legal 
institutions that protect minority investors reduce the “liabilities of state ownership” by making 
SOEs more transparent and accountable. In contrast, political constraints and state capacity 
decrease the ability of state acquirers to reduce PBC (cf. Lazzarini, 2015).  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Private benefits of control 
PBC are returns that controlling shareholders appropriate privately in excess of their cash flow 
rights (Dharwadkar, George, & Brandes, 2000; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Sauerwald & Peng, 
2013; Young et al., 2008). While some PBC are “not necessarily inefficient” (Dyck & Zingales, 
2004, p. 541) because they compensate controlling shareholders for private monitoring and 
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advice (Gilson & Schwartz, 2013), corporate governance scholars generally concur that PBC 
signal the presence of PP agency problems occurring between controlling and minority 
shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Li & Qian, 2013; Sun, Hu, & 
Hillman, 2016; Villalonga & Amit, 2006). If control is privately valuable, the purchase of an 
equity stake large enough to gain control can be used to estimate the value of PBC (Dyck & 
Zingales, 2004). The root cause of substantial PBC is thus a conflict of interests between 
controlling and non-controlling shareholders (Li & Qian, 2013; Singla, Veliyath, & George, 
2014; Young et al., 2008). 
PBC tend to be an important governance concern when controlling shareholders are 
present in the firm (La Porta et al., 1999; Peng & Sauerwald, 2013; Young et al., 2008), since 
they are able to influence firm decision making (La Porta et al., 1999). Controlling ownership 
structures are commonplace not only in Asia (Claessens et al., 2002), Latin America (Céspedes, 
González, & Molina, 2010), and continental Europe (Faccio & Lang, 2002; van Essen et al., 
2013), but also in the U.S. (Dalton et al., 2003; Holderness, 2009) and the U.K. (Franks, Mayer, 
& Rossi, 2009). PBC materialize when controlling shareholders use their influence in the firm to 
initiate self-benefiting transactions, allowing them to appropriate wealth from non-controlling 
shareholders (Djankov et al., 2008; Enriques, 2000).  
Prior studies have documented that such transactions may take different forms. First, 
controlling shareholders or their representatives may “tunnel” corporate resources out of the firm 
by entering into contracts with other entities they control, using transfer prices that are 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
substantially lower than the market value of these resources (Johnson et al., 2000). Second, 
entrenched insiders may reduce firm risk because they receive nonpecuniary private benefits 
such as socioemotional wealth from managing and controlling the firm (Gomez-Mejia, Larraza-
Kintana, & Makri, 2003). Third, controlling shareholders may transfer losses occurring in some 
of their ventures to highly profitable corporations in the same business group to lower corporate 
tax burdens (Conac, Enriques, & Gelter, 2007). Fourth, entrenched insiders may prevent value-
creating corporate control changes in order to perpetuate their position of influence, which denies 
minority owners increases in shareholder wealth (Li & Qian, 2013).  
PBC can further be illustrated by a practical example, namely that of the group of 
companies controlled by the Mexican business leader Carlos Slim (e.g., see The Economist, 
2004, 2008, 2012b, 2013a, 2014a). Mr. Slim has the potential to appropriate PBC from 
exercising his control rights in these companies in at least four different ways. First, he can 
privately acquire local or foreign companies (as has happened in the past with corporations such 
as Cigatam, Hershey Mexico, and Reynolds Aluminum Mexico), and proceed to sell them to a 
business group he owns partly, but controls completely (in this case Grupo Carso) at a premium 
price. Second, he may sell the outputs of firms he owns partly but controls completely (e.g., 
Cigatam’s cigarettes or Hershey Mexico’s confectionary items) at a discounted price to a retail 
firm he owns completely (such as Grupo Sanborns). Third, he can pay himself or his close 
associates salaries or consulting fees for services rendered to firms he owns partly but controls 
completely (such as the telecommunications firms América Móvil and Telcel). Fourth, he may 
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retain the profits generated by companies he owns partly but controls completely in share 
buyback funds, which serve to bolster the value of shares in the hands of insiders (e.g., America 
Movil recently increased the reserves in its buyback fund from 30 to 35 billion pesos; 
Reuters (2015)). Importantly, each of these transactions is legal under Mexican law (The 
Economist, 2012b, 2013a).  
Traditionally, law and finance scholars have proposed to solve the problems created by 
PBC through legal institutional remedies (La Porta et al., 1998). The argument is that legal 
institutions constrain corporate insiders by enforcing strict shareholder rights (Guillén & Capron, 
2016; La Porta et al., 1998) and support efficient contracting between minority and controlling 
shareholders by reducing information asymmetries (Djankov et al., 2008). Yet, the law and 
finance literature has often assumed that legal institutions alone are a sufficient remedy for 
constraining PBC (Dyck & Zingales, 2004), and has thus limited itself to an analysis of the 
indirect, regulatory role of the state in corporate governance (La Porta et al., 1998). This one-
sided attention has left the direct participation of the state in corporate governance through its 
active role as a controlling owner largely untheorized and untested.  
State ownership and PBC 
States may be able to influence PBC by acquiring a controlling ownership stake in firms 
(Carvalhal da Silva & Subrahmanyam, 2007). A controlling ownership position allows 
controlling shareholders the opportunity to implement their interests (Holderness, 2009). One 
line of argument suggests that states become involved in firms through ownership specifically to 
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extract PBC, as previous research has characterized SOEs as pursing personal, political, and 
social goals (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Shleifer & Vishny, 1998). First, when politicians 
exercise the power of a controlling shareholder, they may capture private benefits by engaging in 
related-party transactions or directly expropriate resources (Fan, Wong, & Zhang, 2007; Shleifer 
& Vishny, 1994). Second, states may use firms to pursue political objectives (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1998). These PBC may derive from diverting resources from SOEs to political allies, such as 
favored industries (Claessens, Feijen, & Laeven, 2008) or creating employment opportunities for 
loyal supporters (Dinc & Gupta, 2011). Third, states may prioritize social objectives, such as 
high employment levels (Bai & Xu, 2005). This is especially crucial when the pressure on states 
to maintain social order is high, such as during recessions (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). 
Pursuing social objectives by states is not automatically detrimental for the society overall, as it 
may help lower crime, unemployment, and poverty. However, when this social agenda is 
implemented via SOEs, it involves direct costs for minority shareholders. Lastly, state 
controlling owners are also often ineffective monitors because bureaucrats lack expertise 
(Dharwadkar et al., 2000), monitoring duties among bureaucrats are dispersed across multiple 
regulatory agencies (Zou & Adams, 2008), and low-powered incentives such as fixed salaries are 
commonplace among SOE managers (Cull & Xu, 2005). This lack of effective monitoring could 
result in other stakeholders extracting PBC themselves while the state controlling owner is 
unable to prevent such value expropriation. 
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Nonetheless, the motives of the state for acquiring controlling ownership positions may 
be more geared towards limiting PBC than previously thought. State ownership has transformed 
considerably over time, leading to new varieties of state ownership in which states and private 
investors work side-by-side (Bruton et al., 2015; Grosman et al., 2016; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
2014). These new varieties of state ownership differ from SOEs in which the state is the sole 
shareholder (Megginson & Netter, 2001). Many new SOEs with hybrid or partial state ownership 
structures are not the result of partial privatization, through which states sell off an equity stake 
in an existing SOE to private investors, but the outcome of partial nationalization, through 
which states buy stocks in non-SOEs. Partial state ownership has been found to improve firm 
performance (Gupta, 2005; Inoue et al., 2013), whereas traditional SOEs have a solid track 
record of underperformance (Megginson & Netter, 2001; The Economist, 2014b). Therefore, 
state acquirers may refrain from extracting PBC simply because they want to avoid engaging in 
actions that could harm firm performance, and consequently diminish the market value of their 
own equity stake. This is particularly true because state owners are typically long-term (or 
patient) owners that would be hurt by declines in the market value of their investments.  
Besides direct performance considerations, the state may also be motivated to reduce 
principal-principal agency conflicts. The most immediate “victims” of substantial PBC levels in 
firms with concentrated ownership are minority shareholders, as these parties will have their 
wealth siphoned off (Young et al., 2008). While governments may refrain from consuming PBC 
because they see minority shareholder protection as an important policy goal in itself (La Porta et 
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al., 1998), PBC have more invasive consequences for the policy goals of the state that extend 
beyond the interests of minority shareholders. For instance, PBC signal economic entrenchment 
in the national economy (Morck et al., 2005), which hinders the development of effective 
financial markets (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; Peng, 2003). PBC may also lead to higher 
degrees of income inequality if the returns from economic activities are distributed to political 
allies and cronies (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Levine, 2007). In other words, when the state 
refrains from extracting PBC through its ownership positions, this may be interpreted as a 
campaign for economic development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012). States’ attempts to reduce 
PBC thus do not merely benefit minority shareholders but a wide range of constituencies and a 
broad set of policy goals. By reducing PBC in the firms they control, states set an example of 
good practice for other companies to follow and clear the way for long-term economic success 
(Guillén & Capron, 2016; Hanson & Sigman, 2013). 
By taking direct action, states can control PBC in three ways. First, states may appoint 
directors or executives to the firm, who will then promote change and discipline from within. For 
instance, Li and Qian (2013) show that CEOs with political connections are more likely to 
approve value-creating acquisitions, because politically connected CEOs are interested in 
advancing their political careers by supporting the goals of minority shareholders and society at 
large. Furthermore, Lin and Germain show that new generations of state-appointed managers in 
China infuse SOEs with effective management systems such as detailed work standards and 
comprehensive appraisal systems, thereby breaking the management style of previously 
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entrenched insiders, which frequently “lacked specificity, enforceability, and 
comprehensiveness” (2003, p. 1136). By acting as inside monitors, it becomes easier for states to 
reduce information asymmetries with entrenched insiders and to “curb rent seeking through a 
careful process of policy evaluation” (Lazzarini, 2015, p. 105). In sum, appointing internal 
agents is an important instrument through which states curtail PBC, allowing them to directly 
influence the monitoring and review capabilities of the firms they control. 
Second, states may aid the firm by infusing it with dedicated governance competencies 
(Inoue et al., 2013; Lazzarini, 2015). States often encourage and contribute to the development of 
managerial talent which, in turn, lends targeted support in the areas of general administration, 
performance management, and fiscal issues (Aivazian, Ge, & Qiu, 2005). For instance, 
competent state bureaucrats may push for infrastructure support and investment incentives in 
Chinese SOEs (Park, Li, & Tse, 2006) and bureaucrats in Brazil have supported SOEs with 
patient capital and legitimacy spillovers (Inoue et al., 2013). This type of support from the state 
makes it easier for executives to detect and address unfair third-party transactions and is 
especially useful when the firm’s current management suffers from competency deficiencies 
(Hendry, 2002) or has been appointed for symbolic reasons (Peng, 2004). Research from Brazil 
shows that SOEs enjoy better corporate governance practices than non-SOEs: they have higher 
scores on an established corporate governance index, have proportionately fewer non-voting 
shares, and are more frequently cross-listed in the U.S. Consequently, PBC are lower in Brazilian 
SOEs than in non-SOEs (Carvalhal da Silva & Subrahmanyam, 2007).  
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Third, states can also combat PBC by bringing types of policing and sanctioning powers 
to bear on SOEs to which private shareholders simply have no recourse. States can use the power 
vested in anti-corruption authorities as an instrument against PBC. An example is Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s vow to fight both the “tigers” and “flies” (i.e., high- and low-ranking 
officials and insiders) involved in self-benefiting transactions in SOEs through the anti-
corruption office of the Chinese Communist Party (The Economist, 2013b, 2014c). States can 
thus resort to “gunboat diplomacy” tactics (Duanmu, 2014), preventing expropriation by insiders 
by invoking the sanctioning powers of their anti-corruption apparatuses. In sum, we expect that 
states will be motivated to reduce PBC in the firms they control, and will also have several 
compelling ways to do so. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1: In firms in which the state acquires a controlling ownership position, 
private benefits of control (PBC) will be lower. 
The contingency effect of anti-self-dealing laws 
PBC are prevalent in related-party transactions when insiders engage in self-dealing (Gilson, 
2006) or tunneling (Johnson et al., 2000) at the expense of minority shareholders (Djankov et al., 
2008). States can combat the PBC resulting from such transactions by issuing regulations that 
constrain the ability of insiders to privately benefit from related-party transactions (Shleifer, 
2010). These regulations empower minority shareholders to address PBC through the private 
enforcement of their rights (Bebchuk, 2005), rather than through state-initiated enforcements 
such as fines (Liu & Magnan, 2011). Prior studies have shown that anti-self-dealing regulations 
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help to alleviate PBC concerns among minority shareholders. In China, for example, rates of 
corporate investment are higher in regions in which investors are less concerned about 
expropriation by entrenched insiders (Liu & Siu, 2012). 
While anti-self-dealing laws have been proven useful to reduce PBC overall, they can be 
particularly helpful to decrease PBC in firms with state ownership further. First, while state 
ownership should reduce PBC overall, SOEs are often exposed to a “liability of stateness” 
(Bruton et al., 2015; Musacchio et al., 2015). State managers and directors may lack high-
powered incentives to monitor and advise firms (Bruton et al., 2015; Dharwadkar et al., 2000). 
SOEs may also be subject to the influence of politicians, who may use corporate resources to 
advance their party’s interests or to pursue policies that are likely to get them reelected 
(Musacchio et al., 2015). SOEs may also pursue social goals such as high employment at the 
expense of firm profitability (Bai & Xu, 2005). All of these issues are related to a lack of 
external oversight over SOEs. Specifically, SOEs have been described as “opaque” and as 
operating behind closed doors (Musacchio et al., 2015, p. 126), which may provide opportunities 
to further the goals of the political elite at the expense of the general public (Shughart & 
Razzolini, 2003). It may therefore be useful for governments to create an institutional setting that 
opens up the SOEs and prevents negative government interference. Governments that “self-
commit” to transparency provide “credible mechanisms to monitor the outcomes of policies that 
curb dysfunctional political interference” (Musacchio et al., 2015, p. 126). We therefore expect 
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that stricter ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws help to reduce the liability of stateness in SOEs, and 
consequently reduce PBC. 
Second, when states self-commit to not extract PBC themselves, it does not automatically 
mean that their appointed representatives in SOEs can prevent other firm insiders from extracting 
PBC. While these appointed representatives may be competent and well intentioned, they may 
require additional institutional support to deter other firm insiders from extracting PBC. 
Therefore, states may opt to issue laws that provide these technocrats with the necessary 
instruments to intervene when they observe self-dealing in the firms they administer. This has 
the additional benefit of making anti-self-dealing laws more actionable by combining them with 
insider monitoring. For example, in China, after passing a regulation in 2001 (the “Solutions for 
Listed Firm Checks” regulation) that made monitoring against self-dealing transactions easier by 
pushing for more transparent and universal information disclosure amongst all listed firms, 
regulatory enforcements against self-dealing transactions increased. Interestingly, however, this 
effect was primarily observed in SOEs, and the likelihood of regulatory enforcement increased 
with the percentage of state ownership (Hou & Moore, 2011). We therefore expect ex-ante 
country-level laws promoting transparency and participation to strengthen the PBC-reducing 
effect of state ownership. Thus, 
Hypothesis 2: The negative relationship between state acquirer and private benefits of 
control (PBC) will be stronger in countries characterized by stricter (ex-ante) anti-self-
dealing laws. 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
The contingency effect of political constraints 
Political institutions may be an important contingency condition on the state’s ability to affect 
PBC. Political institutions are the “rules of the game” that constrain the choices of political 
actors, including elected officials and appointed bureaucrats (March & Olsen, 1989). Political 
constraints are an important political institution that reduces the policy discretion of political 
actors by separating political powers, thus creating a system of countervailing powers (Henisz, 
2000). The literature identifies several positive effects of these constraints. For instance, they 
ensure political stability, providing “credible political commitments” that lead to long-term 
investments in the local economy (Garcia-Canal & Guillén, 2008; Henisz, 2000; Holburn & 
Zelner, 2010; Slangen, 2013). Constraints in the political system also make it challenging for 
firms to gain political influence as many political actors must be convinced or compensated. Yet, 
politically constraining the state has downsides. Political constraints slow down the political 
process and may drive domestic companies to invest in more dynamic foreign contexts (Witt & 
Lewin, 2007). Political constraints also hinder privatizations because of the public costs faced by 
politicians (Bortolotti & Pinotti, 2008; Boubakri et al., 2011).  
In relation to the position of minority shareholders and in terms of the state’s involvement 
in corporate governance, we suggest that state acquirers reduce PBC to a lesser degree when 
political constraints are high for three reasons. First, when state controlling owners engage in 
behaviors that harm minority shareholders, this is usually achieved by a “team effort”. For 
instance, in the recent Petrobras scandal in Brazil, the documented value of expropriation efforts 
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surpassed the limits of “classic” forms of PBC extraction and included systematic bribery. 
Several dozen politicians from multiple parties are being investigated, including several top-
ranked officials such as a former president of Brazil. High political constraints imply greater 
political fragmentation in the political process, which provides more political factions with 
opportunities to extract PBC from state-owned corporations. This allows more “grabbing hands” 
to divert resources to political or social causes that may not be in the interest of minority 
shareholders. Moreover, splitting political responsibility between numerous parties may result in 
insufficient incentives for any party to bear the costs of monitoring in the firm (Edmans & 
Manso, 2011). In contrast, if political fragmentation is low, governments are responsible to fewer 
political constituents that may ask for political and social favors.  
Second, the political fragmentation entailed by high political constraints makes it more 
difficult to reach consensus on state policies, including those aimed at PBC reduction (Morck et 
al., 2005). Political parties with different ideologies may vary in their preferences regarding 
SOEs in general, and the issue of PBC extraction in SOEs in particular. On the other hand, SOEs 
may refrain from PBC extraction and channel their efforts towards the narrow goals of the firm 
and well-defined policy objectives when political constraints are low. It has been argued that a 
simple corporate objective improves the management and value of corporations (Jensen, 2002; 
Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). Yet, it is challenging to have clear objectives when the political 
process is fragmented in high political constraint contexts.  
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Lastly, high political constraints could lower the ability of the state to intervene in SOEs 
to ensure alignment with the policy goals of the state. Insiders may take advantage of the 
restricted political discretion associated with high political constraints to pursue their own 
personal agenda. While controlling owners have been regarded as the main beneficiaries of PBC, 
managers and other firm insiders can step up to extract PBC themselves, particularly when the 
state controlling owner is a silent partner. In contrast, when political constraints are low, insiders 
may refrain from extracting PBC because they do not want to risk antagonizing a state owner 
that can respond swiftly and effectively. Overall, the PBC reducing effects of state acquirers may 
be reduced if the government is too constrained to effectively monitor and influence firms 
(Bortolotti et al., 2013). Overall, we predict: 
Hypothesis 3: The negative relationship between state acquirers and private benefits of 
control (PBC) will be weaker in countries characterized by more political constraints. 
The contingency effect of state capacity 
Besides constraints on political actors, another important political institution that may influence a 
state refraining from extracting PBC is state capacity (Guillén & Capron, 2016; Hanson, 2014). 
State capacity captures a state’s ability to enforce its policy objectives. It is an important 
precondition for nation building (Acemoglu, Moscona, & Robinson, 2016) and jumpstarting the 
development process in emerging economies (Hanson, 2014). While a “strong” and capable state 
clearly has many benefits, a fundamental political dilemma is to balance and countervail this 
influence, because a strong government “is also strong enough to confiscate the wealth of its 
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citizens” (Weingast, 1995, p. 1). This argument mirrors findings from the corporate governance 
literature: powerful shareholders can not only help minority investors (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), 
but may also entrench and corrupt themselves (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). 
In the context of constraining PBC, high state capacity may increase the PBC 
consumption of state acquirers, notably when states use the companies they acquire to pursue 
policy goals important to the state and its many stakeholders. First, state capacity increases the 
power of the state (Hanson & Sigman, 2013). Powerful states have the ability to insulate the state 
apparatus from outside influences (Fourcade, 2009). For instance, Guillén and Capron (2016) 
show that high capacity states are less likely to follow the calls from important stakeholder 
groups to improve minority shareholder rights in their countries. Leadership studies similarly 
find that powerful actors often resist calls for strategic change (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Hambrick 
& Fukutomi, 1991). Similarly, powerful state acquirers may resist the pursuit of minority 
shareholder objectives when they transition into a controlling ownership position. This is 
because powerful states may continue to rely on an established state logic that prioritizes the 
policy objectives of the state and its many stakeholders. On the other hand, a less powerful state 
may be less capable of resisting calls from market participants and other shareholders to support 
market-oriented strategies that would benefit the company and its shareholders (Guillén & 
Capron, 2016). 
Second, state capacity may allow state owners to increase their power over firms beyond 
their nominal ownership stake. Firms with highly capable state owners may then be tempted to 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
pursue social and political objectives, because the government now is better able to use the firm 
for its non-capitalist missions. On the other hand, if the state is less powerful, it may be unable to 
extract private benefits for political cronies as well as for political and social missions (Morck et 
al., 2005). For instance, government bureaucrats managing the business may lack incentives to 
implement the policy goals of the government in low capacity states. Overall, we suggest: 
Hypothesis 4: The negative relationship between state acquirers and private benefits of 
control (PBC) will be weaker in countries characterized by more capable states. 
METHODS 
Sample 
We sampled public firms from around the world with private control transactions taking place 
during the period 1990 to 2017. We relied on the Securities Data Company (SDC) international 
mergers and acquisitions database (Albuquerque & Schroth, 2010; Dyck & Zingales, 2004). We 
further restricted our sample to firms covered in Datastream to ensure that we are able to access 
public share prices. We complemented these two data sources with data on firm ownership from 
Thomson One Banker and firm annual reports. The specific selection of private control 
transactions followed Dyck and Zingales (2004).  
First, for PBC to be observed, the transaction must convey control rights and attract 
attention from minority shareholders. Thus, we only considered equity transactions of 10 percent 
or larger to ensure sufficient market attention. In addition, we only considered transactions in 
which the acquirer held less than 20 percent in the target company prior to the transaction, but 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
more than 20 percent as a result of it because shareholders of 20 percent or larger are typically 
considered controlling shareholders (Faccio & Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999, p. 476). From 
these transactions, we excluded spinoffs, recapitalizations, repurchases, acquisitions of 
remaining interest, and acquisitions by management (Dyck & Zingales, 2004, p. 545), as these 
transactions do not involve a control transfer between two independent parties.  
Second, we only selected transactions for which the private benefits are quantifiable. Thus, 
we excluded transactions for which the exchange share price and the size of the control block 
were not available. Additionally, we excluded transactions for which the share price for the 
control block could not be valued objectively (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). This occurs in situations 
in which the transaction involves warrants, convertible bonds, notes, equity swaps, or options to 
buy additional shares (irrespective of whether options are exercised or not). 
Lastly, we checked each control transaction by reading news stories in Lexis-Nexis to 
exclude transactions that did not actually transfer control blocks. This may be the case when two 
subsidiaries of the same parent company rearranged their cross-shareholdings. After screening 
SDC transactions based on all these criteria, we arrived at a comprehensive sample of 1,354 
control transactions during the period 1990 to 2017 from 54 countries around the globe. In 67 of 
these transactions, the state was the acquirer of a controlling equity stake. 
Dependent variable 
Private benefits of control are measured by block premiums (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). They are 
calculated as the price per share the acquirer paid for the control block (i.e., control price) minus 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
the price per share on the stock exchange (i.e., market price) two days after the announcement of 
the control transaction. This difference is divided by the market price and multiplied by the 
proportion of cash flow rights conveyed by the control block. 
PBC range from -31% to 306% in our data. Additional data analysis suggested a positive 
skew in the data with “fatter tails” than a normal distribution. We therefore transformed PBC 
using the inverse hyperbolic sine (IHS) function first proposed by Johnson (1949): 
 sinh-1(x)=log[x+(x2+1)1/2] (1) 
This transformation is also known as “signed pseudo logarithm” because the distribution 
resembles sign(x)*log(|x|). The regression coefficients can be interpreted similarly to log 
transformed dependent variables (Burbidge, Magee, & Robb, 1988; Nyberg et al., 2010; 
Sauerwald, Lin, & Peng, 2016). The IHS transformation usefully compresses ranges with 
extreme values, which allows the regression coefficients to represent the data and not a few 
extreme outliers. 
Block premiums are measured at distinct points in time, which differs from more 
traditionally used acquisition premiums. Acquisition premiums measure the willingness of the 
acquirer to pay over the current market price, typically measured as control price minus the 
market price before the announcement of the control transaction (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997). 
Our block premiums are measured after the announcement of the control transaction. This 
approach is better able to capture PP costs because it gives shareholders time to evaluate the 
intricacies of the control transaction. For instance, the ability to improve the competitive position 
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of the firm due to synergies and improved management are more likely incorporated into the 
market price after the transaction was announced. 
Predictor variables 
State acquirer captures direct state involvement in corporate governance through firm 
ownership. It is measured via a binary variable taking the value “1” if the state bought a 
controlling stake sufficiently large to influence firm strategy (La Porta et al., 1999). This 
condition is met when the state accumulates at least 20 percent of outstanding shares, a measure 
previously used in corporate governance research (Faccio & Lang, 2002). It is also consistent 
with prior research on state capitalism that finds that minority (i.e., less than 50 percent) state 
ownership positions yield considerable state influence (Inoue et al., 2013; Musacchio et al., 
2015). It is worthwhile to mention that states sometimes use other legal entities to acquire stakes 
in target firms. For instance, the state acquirer may not only be the government of a country 
directly, but also a corporation that is ultimately controlled by the state. For the latter cases, we 
checked the shareholder information of all acquirers that were corporations in Thomson One 
Banker to determine if these corporations were ultimately state controlled or not. 
Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws in the home country of the target firm capture indirect state 
involvement in corporate governance through legal institutions aimed at preventing unfair 
related-party transactions in corporations. Consistent with previous studies (Bennedsen & 
Nielsen, 2010; Fidrmuc, Korczak, & Korczak, 2013; Gupta, Prakash, & Rangan, 2013), it was 
measured via the “ex-ante control of self-dealing transactions” index developed by Djankov et al. 
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(2008). Prior studies have also established that ex-ante self-dealing laws are the primary 
determinant of important economic outcomes, such as economic development (Haidar, 2009). 
Political constraints in the home country of the target firm measure the feasibility of 
policy changes, or in other words, how changes in the preferences of any political actor leads to 
policy changes. This is accomplished by capturing the formal relationships among the branches 
of government (i.e., executive, legislative, and judicial) and the political composition of each 
branch. More political branches of government (e.g., two houses in the legislative branch, instead 
of just one house) and different political parties in each branch increase political constraints. We 
use the index developed by Henisz (2000), with values ranging from 0 to 1, where higher scores 
indicating more political constraints and thus less feasibility of policy change. 
State capacity in the home country of the target firm captures the general ability of the 
state to implement its policy goals. State capacity does not measure the various policy objectives 
of states, but rather the extent to which states can effectively achieve them. State capacity is also 
independent from the political regime, meaning both democratic and autocratic states are able to 
develop and disseminate effective policies, and to manage their implementation (Fukuyama, 
2013; Hanson & Sigman, 2013). We use the state capacity index developed by Hanson and 
Sigman (2013), which is a measure used by recent studies because it entails a large coverage of 
countries and years (Guillén & Capron, 2016). In addition, it accounts for the three main 
dimensions of state capacity (i.e., extractive, coercive, and administrative), whereas older 
measures tend to emphasize just one dimension (Fukuyama, 2013). 
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Control variables 
We controlled for several variables at the country, industry, target firm, and acquirer levels of 
analysis. At the country-level, we controlled for two variables measured in the home country of 
the target firm capturing the development of the economy and of the stock market (derived from 
the World Bank). First, we controlled for gross domestic product per capita (GDP/capita), 
defined as the total market value of all goods and services produced in a country divided by 
midyear population (in thousands of US dollars). Second, we controlled for stock market 
capitalization, defined as the market value of all publicly traded firms in the country (in trillions 
of dollars). It was included to control for an active takeover market in which a market for 
controlling blocks exists (Nicodano & Sembenelli, 2004). 
We also controlled for five formal and informal institutions in the home country of the 
target firm. First, cheating on taxes is a response to the World Values Survey (WVS) question 
“cheating on taxes if you have a chance is justified?” The variable was included to control for 
informal institutions that justify PBC at the expense of society at large (Dyck & Zingales, 2004). 
Higher values indicate that tax violations are locally seen as morally justified. Second, freedom 
of press reflects the freedom of journalists and citizens in a country to express their opinions, as 
well as the state’s protection of this freedom, according to Freedom House. This variable was 
included because the media is an important extralegal constraint on controlling shareholders 
(Dyck, Volchkova, & Zingales, 2008). Third, rule of law may increase the effectiveness of 
governments by constraining governmental officials to only use their powers in ways prescribed 
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by formal rules (Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007). We derived rule of law from Freedom 
House. Fourth, we account for the perception of the public that governmental officials do not 
exert public power for private gains. This variable measures control of corruption and was 
derived from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 
2009). Finally, we controlled for ex-post anti-self-dealing laws to account for the ability of 
shareholders to sue controlling agents and hold them liable. This variable was derived from 
Djankov and his associates (2008). 
We also controlled for characteristics of the target firm. First, we controlled for firm size, 
measured as the total sales of the target firm (in ten millions of US dollars). This variable was 
included because larger firms may allow the controlling shareholder or his/her agents to extract 
more PBC. Second, we account for R&D spending, operationalized as the amount of financial 
resources allocated to research and development efforts (in millions of US dollars). Third, 
financial leverage, measured as the ratio of total debt to common equity and expressed as 
percentage, is included because more slack resources may allow more PBC to be extracted. This 
and the previous variable R&D spending are log transformed. Fourth, we included prior 
financial performance (measured as return on assets) because PBC are expected to be higher for 
high-performing firms, partly because the new controlling owner may be able to consume more 
perks and experience less severe monitoring from market intermediaries (Krause, Whitler, & 
Semadeni, 2014). Fifth, we controlled for government sell-out, a dummy equal to 1 if a 
government is the legal entity that sells (part of) its shares in the control transaction. Sixth, we 
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controlled for state minority control in target, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the state was a 
minority shareholder in the target before the transaction. Minority state owners could exert 
influence over the target firm beyond their equity rights (Borisova & Megginson, 2011; 
Bortolotti & Faccio, 2009) and may be able to monitor PBC-seeking acquirers’ behaviors.  
Finally, we included controls for the acquiring firm. Foreign acquirer is a binary variable 
that takes the value “1” if the acquirer is from a different country than the target and “0” if the 
acquirer is from the same country as the target. The variable was collected from SDC Platinum 
and accounts for foreign acquirers’ different legal and cultural origins. 70% of transactions in our 
sample are domestic (i.e., the target firm and the acquirer are from the same country) while 30% 
are cross-border (i.e., the target firm and the acquirer are from different countries) (see Table 1). 
Analysis 
Our sample covers “transactions” of control blocks from one owner (target) to another (acquirer). 
We have one observation per target, resembling a cross-sectional data structure. These 
transactions are embedded in higher-level observational units (i.e., countries), meaning the 
transaction observations are no longer independent and identically distributed (IID) in the same 
country. These within-country dependencies violate the simple ordinary least squares (OLS) 
assumption of stochastic independence of the error terms associated with individual observations 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). We therefore use OLS with cluster-robust standard errors. Dummy 
variables for the transaction years and the industry of the target firms are included in all models. 
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RESULTS 
Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables included in our 
conceptual model. Table 2 presents results for our main models. Model 1 is our baseline model, 
containing only control variables. Confirming earlier findings by Dyck and Zingales (2004), we 
found that PBC are higher when the target firm is located in a country with higher propensity to 
cheat on taxes. Additionally, past firm performance had a positive effect on PBC, suggesting that 
financially healthy firms are more attractive for controlling shareholders wanting to consume 
PBC. 
Model 2 includes our results for the first hypothesis. Hypothesis 1, predicting a negative 
effect of state acquirer on PBC was supported (p < 0.05). It appears that states indeed use their 
controlling ownership positions in public companies to reduce PBC. It is also important to 
interpret these results in terms of their practical significance (Bettis et al., 2016). PBC levels in 
state acquired firms are 10 percent lower than PBC levels in non-state-controlled firms. 
Model 3 includes the interaction term testing Hypothesis 2, predicting that the negative 
relationship between state acquirer and PBC will be more negative in target firms located in 
countries with strong ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws. This hypothesis was confirmed (p < 0.05). 
Figure 1 (Panel A) graphs the interaction effect at low (- 1 SD) and high (+ 1 SD) levels of ex-
ante anti-self-dealing laws. The PBC reducing effect of states acquiring a controlling ownership 
position only appears in the high condition, whereas the effect of state acquirer is not 
significantly different from private controlling acquirers in the low condition. This result 
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supports the argument that states suffer a “liability of stateness” when legal institutions are 
weakly developed.  
Model 4 includes the interaction term testing Hypothesis 3, predicting that state acquirer 
will have a more positive relationship with PBC when political constraints are higher. This 
hypothesis was confirmed (p < 0.05). Figure 1 (Panel B) graphs the interaction at low (- 1 SD) 
and high (+ 1 SD) levels of political constraints, showing a more positive slope when political 
constraints are higher. State acquirers therefore seem to reduce PBC only when the state acquirer 
is relatively unconstrained by competing political factions and complicated political processes. 
Model 5 includes the interaction term testing Hypothesis 4, predicting that state acquirer 
will have a more positive relationship with PBC when state capacity is higher. This hypothesis 
was also confirmed (p < 0.05). Figure 1 (Panel C) graphs the interaction effect at low (- 1 SD) 
and high (+ 1 SD) levels of state capacity, supporting the argument that high capacity states are 
able to use corporations to extract PBC. 
 [Insert Figure 1 and Tables 1 and 2 about here] 
Robustness checks 
We conducted three robustness checks. First, we were concerned about potential selection-based 
endogeneity issues (Clougherty, Duso, & Muck, 2016). This selection issue may be present when 
the acquisition of a controlling ownership stake by a state entity is not random, but driven by 
strategic considerations such as bailing out ailing firms or supporting industries of national 
interest (Lazzarini, 2015). We addressed these selection issues by creating a sample of 
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transactions that is comparable between transactions in which the state acquires a controlling 
stake and transactions in which a private entity acquires a controlling stake (Inoue et al., 2013). 
We used coarsened exact matching (CEM) to reduce the imbalance between treated (i.e., state 
acquisitions) and control (i.e., private acquisitions) observations (Li, Xia, & Lin, 2017). CEM 
reduces imbalance more effectively than other matching techniques (Iacus, King, & Porro, 
2012). We chose to match on prior firm performance, firm size, R&D expenditures, and financial 
leverage as these variables have been theorized to be important determinants of PBC (D’Souza & 
Nash, 2017). As reported in Table 3, the results are similar to our main findings, even with a 
reduced sample size. While the fact that our results hold with a matched sample is encouraging, 
this identification strategy assumes that only observable variables affect the selection bias. 
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
Second, since our data also include cross-border acquisitions, we need to examine 
whether our results hold for domestic and cross-border transactions. We commenced by 
interacting the variable state acquirer with the binary variable foreign acquirer to examine 
whether the level of PBC extracted varies for domestic versus foreign governments. We expect 
that foreign governments reduce PBC to a lesser extent than domestic governments. We find 
supportive evidence in unreported analyses that show a positive moderating effect between state 
acquirer and foreign acquirer (p<0.05). A visual inspection of the interaction effect reveals that 
both slopes are negative, but domestic state acquirers have a more negative effect on PBC. 
Further, we split our sample along the lines of domestic and foreign acquisitions to examine the 
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interaction effects theorized in this paper (Hypotheses 2–4). We see in Table 4 that all theorized 
effects with a domestic state acquirer continue to be significant and in the expected direction. 
However, we find that this picture changes for cross-border deals. Foreign states do not 
significantly reduce PBC in another country. Political institutions (measured in the home country 
of the target) also create no significant interaction effects, which is expected since political 
institutions influence predominantly the behavior of domestic political actors. Interestingly, we 
find that the legal protection of shareholder rights, measured through ex-ante anti-self-dealing 
laws in the home country of the target, results in a significant interaction term, suggesting that 
the legal protection of shareholder rights is an effective constraint even on foreign governments. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 Third, the state capacity measure we used to test Hypothesis 4 is agnostic concerning the 
content of government policy. Higher state capacity might therefore lead to a weaker main effect 
when states use their power to divert firm resources to social goals, or to a stronger main effect 
when states use their influence to implement more sophisticated governance mechanisms to 
reduce PP problems. To better identify the mechanism at play, we accounted for the content of 
government policy. Specifically, we ran a three-way interaction with the political ideology of the 
executive branch (provided by the World Bank Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al., 
2001)). Our expectation is that ideologically “left” (socialist or social democratic) governments 
are more likely to use high state capacity to extract PBC from the firms they acquire than 
ideologically “right” (economically liberal and capitalism-supportive) governments. We find 
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support for this effect in unreported analyses, which show that the results for Hypothesis 4 are 
driven by powerful, ideologically “left” governments. 
DISCUSSION 
While state ownership of firms is commonly believed to be hurtful to the position of minority 
shareholders, the phenomenon of state ownership has changed course considerably in recent 
years (Grosman et al., 2016). Many contemporary SOEs are best conceptualized as partnerships 
between states and private actors in mixed-ownership enterprises (Benito, Rygh, & Lunnan, 
2016; Bruton et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2015; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). In such partnerships, 
states are now more likely than in the past to prioritize the financial performance of these firms, 
and to refrain from using them as policy implementation vehicles. Under these circumstances, 
states will avoid extracting PBCs for personal, social, and political goals, and even actively 
prevent other firm insiders from extracting PBC. In many jurisdictions around the globe, states 
have begun to scale up their involvement in corporate governance (Musacchio & Lazzarini, 
2014; van Essen et al., 2013). They participate increasingly in the administration and governance 
of firms by exercising the control rights associated with their ownership positions (Cuervo-
Cazurra et al., 2014).  
In this study, we have shown that state involvement in firms can help curtail PBC. States 
may reduce PBC directly via acquired control ownership positions by appointing inside monitors 
(Lin & Germain, 2003), by infusing SOEs with modern management practices (Aivazian et al., 
2005), and by bringing the special powers vested in the state to bear on self-benefiting 
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transactions (Borisova & Megginson, 2011). The ability of the state to reduce PBC is enhanced, 
as we have shown, by the development and implementation of strong ex-ante anti-self-dealing 
laws. Such laws make it mandatory to get ex-ante approval for related-party transactions (Conac 
et al., 2007) and to disclose such transactions on an ongoing or periodic basis (Djankov et al., 
2008). We have also shown that various facets of political institutions can affect the ability of 
states to address PBC. Political constraints, which lead to political fragmentation, can make it 
more difficult for states to realize their policy goal of constraining PBC. State capacity, while in 
principle necessary for advancing and implementing the state’s policy goals, can also act 
counterproductively when states prioritize social development and the attainment of related 
policy goals at the country level over and above the realization of financial performance and the 
upholding of shareholder goals at the firm level.  
In short, while prior research frequently overlooks states’ ambitions and attempts in the 
area of curtailing PBC in SOEs (but see exceptions such as Carvalhal da Silva & 
Subrahmanyam, 2007; Haß, Johan, & Müller, 2016), we have shown that states deliberately exert 
effort and are frequently effective in terms of limiting PBC.  
Theoretical implications 
Prior research has primarily stressed the faults and weaknesses associated with state ownership 
of firms. For example, Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) have shown that in a broad international 
sample, SOEs are less profitable than non-SOEs because they appear to be trading off cash flows 
towards minority shareholders against the public policy goal of full employment. Furthermore, 
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Wang, Wong, and Xia (2008) show that local SOEs in China tend to avoid reputable accounting 
firms, opting instead for smaller and more acquiescent local auditors that may facilitate 
government owners’ pursuit of private gains and political goals. When we coalesce these 
findings, it appears that the dominant view in the SOE literature currently is that minority 
shareholders face substantial PP agency problems when states are the controlling shareholder and 
will likely have to bear the costs of soft budgeting, self-dealing, and the pursuit of political goals. 
Our study puts forward important theoretical implications that nuance this dominant view.  
First, to the SOE literature (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2014; Musacchio et al., 2015), we add 
a stewardship perspective on the role of the state in corporate governance, which complements 
the often invoked agency theoretical perspective of SOEs (Musacchio et al., 2015). We show that 
minority shareholders frequently also benefit from being associated with a firm in which the state 
becomes a controlling owner. Our study supports the view that in the past two decades, states 
have accepted a more active and strategic role in corporate governance (Bruton et al., 2015; 
Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014). We interpret these findings as evidence for a stewardship 
perspective on state capitalism (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003), suggesting that states and politicians 
are ready to combat PBC, which eventually benefit minority shareholders. Thus, rather than 
treating government involvement in corporate governance as an agency problem in its own right, 
we encourage researchers to also apply the alternate stewardship frame. In a stewardly take on 
government participation in corporate governance, states are seen as influential actors committed 
to making interventions in the economy that will lead to positive change. These actions may aim 
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at protecting the interests of minority shareholders, refraining from coopting SOEs for the pursuit 
of policy objectives that do not benefit the immediately involved stakeholders, or breaking the 
power of entrenched insiders.  
Second, we advance the international business literature (Hoskisson et al., 2013; Peng et 
al., 2009) by calling greater attention to the cross-level conditioning effects of legal and political 
institutions on firm behavior. To understand the behavior of state owners, it is essential to 
consider the institutional context in which they operate, because even state owners (not only 
private owners) are simultaneously constrained and empowered by institutions (cf. Peng & Luo, 
2000). Our study provides a case in point. Unlike many institution-based view authors before us, 
we do not theoretically focus on the direct effects institutions have on micro-outcomes. Instead, 
we hypothesize and demonstrate that the effects of institutions operate by empowering or 
inhibiting state acquirers at the micro-level. Stronger legal and political institutions thus can help 
make state-acquired corporations more accountable towards minority shareholders (Lazzarini, 
2015; Musacchio & Lazzarini, 2014; Musacchio et al., 2015). Clearly, this is only one example 
of how the institutional context produces firm- and societal-level outcomes by imposing 
constraints on micro-level actors (Peng et al., 2009). Theoretically, however, this example calls 
upon institution-based view scholars to pay greater attention to the mechanisms engendering 
concrete interactions between legal and political institutions and organization-level actors 
(Martin, 2014). 
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Future research 
Our study opens the door to several fruitful research opportunities. First, there is ample evidence 
to support both the agency view (Dharwadkar et al., 2000) and stewardship perspectives (Inoue 
et al., 2013) on state involvement in private corporations. While our study has made first 
attempts into uncovering the costs and benefits of state influence in PBC reduction, future 
research must establish a clearer balance of the evidence. An important avenue is to identify the 
firm-level conditions determining whether state acquirers will act as opportunistic agents or 
helpful stewards. Second, prior institution-based studies have not so much ignored the role of 
micro-level agency, but they have left it largely implicit or, when explicitly theorized, 
empirically untested (Ingram & Silverman, 2002; Peng et al., 2009; Wan & Hoskisson, 2003). 
We encourage institutional scholars to more explicitly theorize the underlying microfoundations. 
CONCLUSION 
Scholars are increasingly recognizing that states are able to play a more active and strategic role 
in corporate governance (Musacchio et al., 2015; Stephan et al., 2015). However, many 
important questions concerning this more active role remain unaddressed. In this paper, we 
touched upon one of these questions: How do state owners affect private benefits of control? Our 
study, in which we measured and analyzed PBC via acquisitions of controlling ownership 
positions in 54 countries across the globe, yielded important evidence to help answer this 
question. Effective states do not shun involvement in corporate governance. Our results thus 
paint a picture of modern states as stewards, capable of keeping their own representatives in 
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check and working together with firms and minority shareholders in the spirit of mutually 
beneficial public-private partnerships. We also find evidence that the extent to which state 
owners reduce PBC depends on the legal and political institutions that can either inhibit or 
empower state owners to reduce PBC. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
# Variable Name Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
1 Private benefits of control (PBC) 0.44 2.48 1.00                   
2 GDP/capita 23.27 14.88 -0.01 1.00                  
3 Stock market capitalization 81.21 76.12 -0.09 0.32 1.00                 
4 Cheating on taxes 2.16 0.49 0.18 -0.05 -0.09 1.00                
5 Freedom of press 28.74 27.99 -0.09 -0.50 -0.23 -0.04 1.00               
6 Rule of law 5.37 6.18 -0.03 0.52 0.13 -0.03 -0.08 1.00              
7 Control of corruption 0.93 1.07 0.07 0.61 -0.02 0.03 -0.53 0.27 1.00             
8 Ex-post anti-self-dealing laws 0.73 0.19 -0.01 0.25 0.22 0.01 -0.29 -0.05 0.41 1.00            
9 Firm size 83.71 307.79 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.03 -0.07 0.06 0.05 0.00 1.00           
10 R&D spending 3.13 0.89 0.06 -0.10 -0.07 0.05 0.09 -0.12 -0.09 -0.09 0.11 1.00          
11 Financial leverage 3.90 1.99 0.02 -0.11 -0.10 0.04 0.00 -0.17 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.17 1.00         
12 Prior financial performance 1.63 69.15 0.06 -0.09 -0.07 -0.03 0.06 -0.03 -0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.05 -0.03 1.00        
13 Government sell-out 0.05 0.23 -0.06 -0.19 -0.11 -0.09 0.20 -0.09 -0.15 -0.14 0.00 0.06 0.06 0.00 1.00       
14 State minority control in target 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.04 -0.04 0.03 -0.07 0.04 0.10 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 0.04 1.00      
15 Foreign acquirer 0.30 0.46 0.08 0.08 -0.10 0.05 -0.07 0.07 0.17 -0.04 0.06 -0.05 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.04 1.00     
16 Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws 0.62 0.31 -0.08 -0.35 -0.10 -0.01 0.41 -0.14 -0.20 0.01 -0.14 0.02 -0.08 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.05 1.00    
17 Political constraints 0.58 0.34 0.11 0.43 -0.15 0.18 -0.55 0.31 0.69 0.25 0.09 -0.09 0.09 -0.03 -0.13 -0.01 0.16 -0.40 1.00   
18 State capacity 1.40 0.72 0.05 0.60 0.05 0.01 -0.46 0.22 0.93 0.47 0.02 -0.08 0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.05 0.13 -0.11 0.63 1.00  
19 State acquirer 0.05 0.22 -0.05 -0.09 -0.01 0.02 0.17 -0.02 -0.12 -0.13 0.05 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.07 -0.12 -0.10 1.00 
N = 1,354. Correlations with an absolute value of larger than 0.08 are significant at the p < 0.05 level. 
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Table 2: Regression Models of PBC on State Acquirer 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable: PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC 
GDP/capita -0.017* -0.017** -0.017** -0.017** -0.016* 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Stock market capitalization -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cheating on taxes 0.841*** 0.850*** 0.842*** 0.825*** 0.790*** 
 (0.223) (0.225) (0.205) (0.222) (0.225) 
Freedom of press -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Rule of law 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.015 -0.002 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.045) (0.011) 
Control of corruption 0.206 0.190 0.179 0.203 0.267 
 (0.247) (0.246) (0.235) (0.244) (0.219) 
Ex-post anti-self-dealing laws -0.355 -0.418 -0.379 -0.386 -0.337 
 (0.711) (0.706) (0.607) (0.712) (0.677) 
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D spending 0.154*** 0.151*** 0.150** 0.150*** 0.154*** 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.067) (0.056) (0.057) 
Financial leverage -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.016 -0.020 
 (0.046) (0.045) (0.035) (0.045) (0.042) 
Prior financial performance 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Government sell-out -0.415* -0.406* -0.413 -0.423* -0.475* 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.278) (0.238) (0.246) 
State minority control in target 0.788*** 0.821*** 0.790*** 0.771*** 0.876*** 
 (0.198) (0.185) (0.175) (0.207) (0.203) 
Foreign acquirer 0.237 0.241 0.236 0.224 0.222 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.206) (0.180) (0.166) 
Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws -0.505 -0.502 -0.452 -0.490 -0.562* 
 (0.312) (0.312) (0.375) (0.311) (0.334) 
Political constraints -0.347 -0.353 -0.342 -0.430 -0.166 
 (0.518) (0.523) (0.360) (0.533) (0.528) 
State Capacity 0.007 0.039 0.051 0.028 -0.097 
 (0.301) (0.303) (0.320) (0.300) (0.286) 
Hypotheses Testing      
State acquirer  -0.531** 0.285 -1.177*** -1.247*** 
  (0.265) (0.388) (0.398) (0.298) 
State acquirer X Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws  
 
-1.114** 
    (0.544) 
State acquirer X Political constraints  
  
1.641** 
   (0.668) 
State acquirer X State Capacity     0.661** 
     (0.306) 
Constant -1.062 -1.031 -1.118 -0.994 -0.430 
 (1.282) (1.281) (0.970) (1.287) (0.769) 
Number of Countries 54 54 54 54 54 
Number of Transactions 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,354 1,354 
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R2 0.100 0.105 0.109 0.110 0.108 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered on country level; Year and industry effects are 
included but not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
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Table 3: Regression Models based on CEM Sample 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 
Dependent Variable: PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC 
GDP/capita -0.016* -0.016* -0.016** -0.016* -0.015 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Stock market capitalization -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Cheating on taxes 0.805*** 0.813*** 0.805*** 0.786*** 0.750*** 
 (0.215) (0.216) (0.195) (0.214) (0.217) 
Freedom of press -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.006) 
Rule of law 0.013 0.012 0.011 0.011 -0.004 
 (0.043) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044) (0.011) 
Control of corruption 0.171 0.155 0.144 0.172 0.236 
 (0.247) (0.246) (0.246) (0.243) (0.226) 
Ex-post anti-self-dealing laws -0.150 -0.210 -0.176 -0.184 -0.153 
 (0.687) (0.681) (0.587) (0.687) (0.674) 
Firm size 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D spending 0.172*** 0.169*** 0.168** 0.169*** 0.164*** 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.071) (0.058) (0.060) 
Financial leverage -0.032 -0.032 -0.032 -0.029 -0.028 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.035) (0.046) (0.044) 
Prior financial performance 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Government sell-out -0.412* -0.403* -0.410 -0.420* -0.457* 
 (0.236) (0.235) (0.273) (0.238) (0.246) 
State minority control in target 0.768*** 0.808*** 0.775*** 0.759*** 0.901*** 
 (0.255) (0.240) (0.191) (0.262) (0.256) 
Foreign acquirer 0.221 0.224 0.220 0.208 0.199 
 (0.181) (0.180) (0.198) (0.179) (0.171) 
Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws -0.537* -0.533 -0.484 -0.523 -0.609* 
 (0.319) (0.320) (0.385) (0.320) (0.333) 
Political constraints -0.347 -0.345 -0.334 -0.418 -0.132 
 (0.523) (0.528) (0.376) (0.537) (0.541) 
State Capacity 0.035 0.066 0.079 0.053 -0.062 
 (0.302) (0.304) (0.327) (0.301) (0.300) 
Hypotheses Testing      
State acquirer  -0.525* 0.231 -1.214*** -1.264*** 
  (0.270) (0.411) (0.403) (0.314) 
State acquirer X Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws   -1.068*   
   (0.576)   
State acquirer X Political constraints    1.655**  
    (0.651)  
State acquirer X State Capacity     0.674** 
     (0.309) 
Constant -1.176 -1.155 -1.233 -1.110 -0.525 
 (1.231) (1.228) (0.909) (1.234) (0.729) 
Number of Countries 54 54 54 54 54 
Number of Transactions 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 1,319 
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R2 0.104 0.107 0.110 0.111 0.112 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered on country level; Year and industry effects are 
included but not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 4: Regression Models Split Sample between Domestic and Foreign Acquisitions 
Model 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Domestic Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign Foreign 
Dependent Variable: PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC PBC 
GDP/capita -0.018 -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 -0.025 -0.029 -0.030 -0.029 -0.029 -0.022 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.016) 
Stock market capitalization -0.003** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002** -0.003*** -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) 
Cheating on taxes 0.542*** 0.551*** 0.543*** 0.530*** 0.504** 0.374 0.376 0.369 0.163 0.490 
 (0.164) (0.164) (0.160) (0.162) (0.201) (0.289) (0.291) (0.288) (0.250) (0.291) 
Freedom of press -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 0.003 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006) (0.018) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) (0.004) 
Rule of law 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.051 0.004 -0.039 -0.037 -0.029 -0.039 0.001 
 (0.071) (0.073) (0.074) (0.072) (0.020) (0.106) (0.103) (0.064) (0.097) (0.029) 
Control of corruption -0.041 -0.052 -0.050 -0.027 0.055 0.451 0.440 0.437* 0.474 0.441** 
 (0.182) (0.180) (0.179) (0.174) (0.218) (0.287) (0.284) (0.237) (0.290) (0.200) 
Ex-post anti-self-dealing laws -0.379 -0.483 -0.468 -0.405 -0.359 -0.648 -0.674 -0.408 -0.475 -0.881 
 (0.967) (0.972) (0.981) (0.982) (1.027) (1.308) (1.284) (1.023) (1.292) (1.176) 
Firm size -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
R&D spending 0.288** 0.285** 0.284** 0.284** 0.284** 0.142 0.141 0.158 0.155 0.116 
 (0.135) (0.135) (0.135) (0.134) (0.136) (0.141) (0.144) (0.163) (0.162) (0.125) 
Financial leverage 0.023 0.022 0.023 0.025 0.015 -0.050 -0.049 -0.048 -0.079 -0.019 
 (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.054) (0.054) (0.061) (0.065) (0.050) 
Prior financial performance 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Government sell-out -0.949* -0.949* -0.957* -0.958* -0.901* -0.164 -0.134 -0.154 -0.345 -0.441 
 (0.515) (0.508) (0.511) (0.513) (0.449) (0.809) (0.824) (1.183) (0.732) (0.849) 
State minority control in target 0.839*** 0.879*** 0.834*** 0.823*** 0.956*** 0.889** 0.914** 1.005** 0.816 0.939* 
 (0.151) (0.143) (0.158) (0.156) (0.184) (0.410) (0.389) (0.445) (0.525) (0.503) 
Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws -0.154 -0.147 -0.117 -0.142 -0.285 -0.766 -0.764 -0.593 -0.555 -0.698 
 (0.503) (0.498) (0.502) (0.498) (0.467) (0.751) (0.749) (0.577) (0.710) (0.660) 
Political constraints 0.013 0.032 0.040 -0.058 0.123 0.046 0.057 0.134 0.025 -0.251 
 (0.589) (0.582) (0.582) (0.568) (0.559) (0.668) (0.685) (0.658) (0.629) (0.779) 
State Capacity 0.402 0.446 0.441 0.413 0.452 -0.321 -0.295 -0.358 -0.311 -0.400 
 (0.553) (0.554) (0.556) (0.549) (0.526) (0.596) (0.601) (0.509) (0.587) (0.466) 
Hypotheses Testing           
State acquirer  -0.562*** 0.050 -0.905*** -2.024***  -0.373 1.243 -2.832 1.328 
  (0.199) (0.641) (0.284) (0.454)  (0.727) (0.825) (3.220) (1.990) 
State acquirer X Ex-ante anti-self-dealing laws   -0.754*     -2.832**   
   (0.370)     (1.236)   
State acquirer X Political constraints    1.361**     3.583  
    (0.540)     (2.260)  
State acquirer X State Capacity     1.286***     -1.023 
     (0.292)     (1.288) 
Constant -0.878 -0.902 -0.921 -0.846 -0.974 0.499 0.508 0.120 0.993 1.263 
 (1.209) (1.202) (1.204) (1.179) (0.970) (1.367) (1.382) (1.048) (1.294) (1.183) 
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Number of Countries 49 49 49 49 49 47 47 47 47 47 
Number of Transactions 948 948 948 948 948 406 406 406 406 406 
R2 0.128 0.131 0.133 0.134 0.135 0.125 0.125 0.132 0.125 0.125 
Robust standard errors in parentheses; Standard errors clustered on country level; Year and industry effects are included but not reported. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
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Figure 1: Interaction Graphs 
Panel A: State Acquirer Interaction with Anti Self-Dealing Laws 
 
Panel B: State Acquirer Interaction with POLCON 
 
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
P
B
C
 (A
si
nh
)
0 1
State acquirer
Ex-ante anti-self-dealing low Ex-ante anti-self-dealing high
State Acquirer Interactions
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
P
B
C
 (A
si
nh
)
0 1
State acquirer
Political constraints low Political constraints high
State Acquirer Interactions
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
Panel C: State Acquirer Interaction with State Capacity 
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